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ABSTRACT 
Aviation wishes to take advantage of signals from 
multiple GNSS core constellations1 in order to provide a 
robust, high-performing and continuous service to 
aircraft. This goal requires that each State accepts signals 
from at least one or more foreign constellation providers 
in its Air Navigation Service (ANS) provision. While 
GPS has already been introduced in aviation for many 
years, it has evolved from a supplemental means service 
to an essential ingredient for Performance Based 
Navigation (PBN) and a host of other Communications, 
Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) applications. Non-
core constellation provider States have in some cases 
struggled with the legal implications of allowing the use 
of navigation signals from a foreign entity in their 
airspaces. This has led to the establishment of a “Charter 
on Rights and Obligations of States Relating to GNSS 
Services” by ICAO in 1998, still in force as Assembly 
Resolution 32-19 [1]. The charter contains only very high 
level principles relating mainly to safety and cooperation 
– but practical implementation details are missing. With 
the development of multi-constellation GNSS, some 
concerns resurface and remain unaddressed while others 
evolve in the sense that multi-constellation GNSS may 
actually provide solutions.  
Very little legal work has been done on the subject since 
the publication of the Charter and almost no case law is 
available on GNSS legal issues or any related domain – 
which is actually a credit to the high quality service 
provided by GPS that aviation has benefitted from for 
many years. The paper, which is intended for a non-legal 
expert audience, will summarize the current legal 
mechanisms and address challenges such as sovereignty, 
                                                          
1 A core constellation is providing a set of global orbiting 
satellites which enable the calculation of a position 
solution, such as GPS, GLONASS, Galileo or Beidou. 
The term “core” constellation differentiates from other 
satellites used to provide augmentation services (QZSS, 
WAAS, EGNOS, other commercial services). 
liability and the legal consequences of approving GNSS 
elements2 in a State’s airspace in the context of multi-
constellation GNSS. Furthermore, it will propose 
practical mitigations to those challenges, essentially based 
on the established practice with current GPS L1-based 
operations3 and a more detailed interpretation of the 
GNSS Charter principles. A particular topic of technical 
interest will be the evaluation of the need for and benefits 
of introducing a State-specific receiver selection 
capability of individual GNSS elements based on a 
geographic database. Such a capability is one element of 
the GNSS concept of operations (CONOPS) currently 
being developed by ICAO [2]. 
The goal of the paper is to support the implementation of 
multi-constellation GNSS for aviation by addressing legal 
concerns and providing guidance on the need and 
functionality of any associated technical functionalities. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Moving from the current widespread use of single 
frequency GPS to multi-constellation GNSS is expected 
to significantly mitigate current GNSS vulnerabilities, 
such as constellation weakness, the impact of solar 
activity on propagation through the ionosphere, and 
unintentional, single-frequency radio interference. While 
this is highly desirable from an overall aviation system 
point of view, such benefits are difficult to quantify to 
aircraft operators who are already enjoying very reliable 
service with current GPS. Due to this small cost-benefit 
                                                          
2 GNSS as defined by aviation includes both core 
constellation services and their augmentation, which is 
either aircraft, space or ground-based. A GNSS “element” 
can consequently be either a core constellation or an 
augmentation service. 
3 The civil GPS L1 C/A code signal on 1575.42 MHz as 
used by the large majority of aviation receivers today. 
 trade space and the overall safety-motivated desire to 
keep receiver functionalities as simple as possible, 
equipment manufacturers wish to apply a performance-
based approach to GNSS element selection, where the 
receiver independently decides which signals are best 
suited to achieve the required level of navigation 
performance. While the performance-based principle is 
also well established in the International Civil Aviation 
Organization, ICAO [3], it directly clashes with the desire 
of States to approve which navigation signals are used in 
their airspace. This desire stems from justified concerns 
over sovereignty and legal issues, equally based on ICAO 
principles. 
The objective of this paper is to provide satisfactory 
arguments to resolve and mitigate these concerns, such 
that future multi-constellation GNSS receivers can 
continue to provide cost-efficient positioning and 
navigation services to support future airspace 
improvements. 
 
CURRENT GNSS STATE APPROVAL STATUS 
ICAO Annex 15 [4] and other materials [5] oblige States 
to publish in their official Aeronautical Information 
Publications (AIP) which GNSS elements (core 
constellations and associated augmentation services) are 
approved for use in their airspace. Currently, only 9 out 
of 41 EUROCONTROL member States make such 
statements in their AIP [6]; the situation is expected to be 
similar globally. Among the remaining States, some have 
approved procedures permitting or even requiring the use 
of GPS. Due to uncertainty of the legal implications of 
such an AIP entry, and the general struggle to formally 
approve GPS (in Europe, this is also linked to single 
European sky service provision regulations), they have 
chosen to leave the matter in ambiguity. Meanwhile, it is 
generally well understood that aircraft operators will use 
their equipment capabilities everywhere, regardless of a 
State’s individual GNSS approval declaration. This is in 
line with the approvals obtained in their State of registry. 
In the case of PBN specifications allowing the use of 
multiple navigation sensors, such States will often 
formally base their procedures on terrestrial navigation 
aids (DME/DME and VOR/DME Area Navigation), 
while the standard use of GPS remains a “supplemental-
use” choice by aircraft operators. While not having been 
the case for any aeronautical navigation system in the 
past, the currently ongoing standardization process now 
envisions the implementation of geo-referenced tuning of 
GNSS elements, automatically respecting the State 
approved elements even in en-route and terminal area 
navigation. Such a feature is thought to be necessary to 
mitigate State concerns over sovereignty and liability of 
GNSS.    
 
SOVEREIGNTY, GNSS AND ANS PROVISION 
ANS provision is a State responsibility under article 28 of 
the Chicago Convention (CC) on international civil 
aviation [7], where “each contracting State undertakes… 
to provide in its territory… radio services… to facilitate 
international air navigation4”. States view this provision 
as an exercise of a sovereign function in accordance with 
article 1 CC which establishes sovereignty of States as 
the foremost principle of the Convention.  Despite the 
territorial link in article 28, it is established practice to 
delegate a State’s ANS provision (such as to a private 
national entity), including foreign entities. The typical 
case for delegation of ANS to foreign entities is to 
neighboring States where an airport is located close to the 
State border. In the interest of safety and efficiency, this 
prevents aircraft operators having to switch between State 
ANS providers while performing approaches to or 
departures from such an airport. In most cases where the 
airspace in an adjacent State is joined to the ANS 
provision of such an airport, delegation agreements are in 
force. This allows the delegating State to exercise a 
certain amount of control (clear rights and obligations, 
performance targets, certification process, system 
surveillance). The stipulation of such an agreement can be 
seen as ensuring a respect of State sovereignty.  
When applying this ANS delegation practice to GNSS, it 
is generally accepted that operators of core constellations 
will not enter into such agreements with potentially all the 
ANS providers around the globe. The absence of such 
agreements can be interpreted as an infringement of State 
sovereignty in ANS provision while at the same time 
implying a waiver of liability by the core constellation 
operator. This topic was the subject of intense debate over 
several years, leading up to the setting up of a ICAO 
Legal and Technical Expert Panel (LTEP) from 1995 to 
1998 [A1]. The main agreement resulting from the LTEP 
was the GNSS Charter [8], which establishes high level 
principles relating to the use of GNSS in ANS provision. 
The final LTEP report [9] further considers that “GNSS 
core constellation services… are not an ANS under article 
28 CC” but rather an external ingredient which “provides 
navigation aid signals for use in aircraft positioning”. 
Because GNSS systems are generally not specifically 
designed to directly meet aviation requirements, they are 
all subject to augmentation systems which ensure the 
accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability needed to 
support the intended operation. Thus, the aircraft, ground- 
or space-based augmentation service (ABAS, GBAS, 
SBAS) is what makes GNSS an ANS and is consequently 
the service which is subject to standard aviation safety 
oversight. It is then the responsibility of the augmentation 
                                                          
4 Air Navigation Services include all services required to 
conduct flight operations under instrument flight rules, 
including Air Traffic Control, Communications, 
Navigation and Surveillance, Aeronautical Information 
and Meteorological Services, etc (thus not at all limited to 
navigation only, even if this is the focus of this paper). 
service and system design to ensure that critical core 
constellation performance assumptions are maintained. 
The distinction between core constellation and 
augmentation services is used to justify that the use of 
foreign-controlled GNSS signals by aviation does not 
infringe sovereignty. While the associated assembly 
resolution to conduct further work to resolve legal issues 
associated with GNSS remains in force [10], it has been 
downgraded in priority in 2012 and States have accepted 
that no amendments to the Chicago Convention are 
deemed necessary to accommodate the use of GNSS in 
ANS provision [11].    
 
NEW ARGUMENTS TO ADDRESS 
SOVEREIGNTY IN RELATION TO GNSS-BASED 
ANS PROVISION 
While the distinction between core constellation and 
augmentation system services is useful, it can be seen as a 
rather academic distinction. Without core constellation 
signals, no augmentation service will be able to meet its 
performance requirements, i.e., it will not work at all. It is 
consequently useful to evaluate the actual concerns 
behind the sovereignty principle. One sovereignty 
concern is the intrusion of a foreign State into domestic 
issues of another State. In the case of GNSS however, the 
core constellation State is only providing an offer, based 
on established standards in ICAO Annex 10 [12], which 
will facilitate the provision of ANS, and from which the 
other State directly benefits. It is up to each State 
receiving GNSS signals to accept them as part of their 
navigation services. In terms of intrusion into airspace, 
GNSS only provides positioning, allowing a 
determination in which State an aircraft is located. It does 
not navigate the aircraft – this is done by the pilot in 
cooperation with the avionics. If anything, GNSS can be 
helpful in avoiding airspace infringements. The use of 
GNSS by aircraft has no influence on the decision by any 
State to grant access to its airspace or not. In comparison 
with other sovereignty issues such as the use of earth 
observation satellites to gather intelligence of another 
States’ activities5, this intrusion does seem rather minor. 
In terms of dependence on a foreign entity, there is of 
course valid concern over giving a foreign State 
significant control over another State’s ANS provision, 
which has a significant role in the economic well-being of 
a State in supporting, for example, tourism revenues and 
business relationships. From that point of view, it is 
understandable that a State may consider that the letters 
of commitment to ICAO [13], the supporting standards 
and documents, as well as the 6 year advance notice 
requirement [12, section 2.1.4.1] in case a core 
                                                          
5 Sovereignty concerns relating to earth observation were 
mitigated primarily by assuring that the observed State 
can derive benefits from the other State’s activity, i.e., 
obtain access to the data. The benefit is very clear in the 
case of GNSS. 
constellation provider State would decide to significantly 
alter or terminate its service, can be seen as insufficient. 
After all, it may be difficult for a State to react quickly to 
any such changes, while the evolution of world politics 
and economics is difficult to predict. Furthermore, most if 
not all GNSS core constellations are subject to national 
defense interests. 
There are two main arguments that mitigate this very 
pertinent concern. The first is that each State is at liberty 
and actually advised to maintain an alternate terrestrial 
infrastructure, based on current terrestrial navigation aids, 
in particular VOR and DME [12, Attachment H]. While 
operational aviation efficiency may still be impacted in 
the event of a significant GNSS service change, this 
impact and the associated dependence can be reduced 
significantly. The second argument is that if foreign 
dependence is really the concern, then as many GNSS 
core constellations as possible should be approved! After 
all, this is what motivated the European Union and the 
Peoples Republic of China to build their own, 
independent satellite navigation systems alongside the 
USA and the Russian Federation. One main issue in the 
discussions of the LTEP on sovereignty was that the US 
at the time held a global monopoly with GPS – something 
which is now changing. 
When evaluating the issue of foreign ANS dependence, a 
further argument can be identified, which is risk-based. 
What is the actual risk that for example, the United States 
of America would disable GPS? Aviation has incurred 
considerable complexity from the fact that GNSS is a 
multi-modal, multi-user system. It necessitates 
augmentation systems and makes aviation subject to radio 
frequency interference which is typically not directed at 
aviation. While this is the downside, one should not 
forget the upside: this dependence by many economic 
sectors (not to mention military forces!) on GPS provides 
clear justification in that risk being extremely small due 
to the dramatic consequences this would have on nearly 
all aspects of modern human activity, not only abroad 
[14], but also in the United States [15]. At least judging 
by the experience of the last two decades, GPS is 
providing significant economic advantage to the U.S. and 
its industry, such that it becomes rather difficult to 
hypothesize cases of why the U.S. would modify 
negatively its GPS service. It must also be remembered in 
this context that satellite orbits are bound to the physics 
of Keplerian orbits, thus making the possibility for any 
local performance optimizations at the expense of other 
global regions quite minimal [16]. The resulting domestic 
policy statements by the U.S. [17, 18] are a clear 
recognition of the economic value of GPS and its 
intention to maintain the system for the foreseeable 
future. 
As a final argument on the matter of sovereignty, where 
the lack of a binding agreement may be seen as an 
obstacle, it must be considered what the content of such 
an agreement would be. Using the example of GPS, it can 
be observed that for the most part, the U.S. is already 
providing what would likely be key aspects of such an 
 agreement. This would include user support and quick 
notifications in case there are problems with the system 
performance, provided by the U.S. Coast Guard GPS 
Navigation Center. It would also include system 
performance standards [19] and interface control 
documents [20], subject to a public review process when 
changes or updates are considered. In the case of the few 
system malfunctions that have been encountered over the 
years (such as the SVN49 issue, [21]), transparent 
analysis and information has been provided to public 
forums, such as the Civil GPS Service Interface 
Committee (CGSIC) or through the U.N. International 
Committee on GNSS (UN ICG). The only aspect that 
could be seen as missing would be more explicit 
obligations towards aviation stipulated through ICAO. 
For this reason, it has been proposed [22] to provide 
further details of how the ICAO GNSS Charter provisions 
are to be interpreted, by providing a description of the 
practice that has been established by GPS, making it a 
benchmark for other constellations. Current developments 
in the ICAO Navigation Systems Panel are supporting 
this proposal [23]. 
Based on the arguments above, it seems that apart from a 
States’ right to accept or not the use of a GNSS element 
in its airspace, concerns over sovereignty can be 
sufficiently mitigated. It could even be argued that States 
have implicitly accepted this by not filing differences6 to 
the core constellation standards in Annex 10. However, 
such an argument does not weigh up against the justified 
concern of any State over foreign dependence (where the 
nature of GNSS constellation systems is such that most 
States cannot afford this). The most relevant argument 
remains that if a State is concerned about foreign 
dependence, all available GNSS signals should be 
authorized for aviation use. Any associated effort to do so 
will surely pale against the cost of actually providing such 
services independently. 
Finally, while a right of a State to approve or not the use 
of a GNSS element in its airspace can be derived from the 
principle of sovereignty, one must still ask what the 
purpose could be of not allowing the use of such GNSS 
elements, especially if other States have approved them. 
Here, safety is the only concern and justification. If a 
GNSS core constellation system is not supporting safe 
operations in a given airspace, then of course it is 
                                                          
6 ICAO contracting States are obliged to “file 
differences”, i.e., inform ICAO if they do not comply 
with any part of the standards in the Annexes which could 
have an impact on global safety and interoperability. 
Also, standards are agreed through a State Letter process 
where States can state their (justified) disagreements with 
the proposed standards. How differences are managed in 
the context of GNSS is subject to some interpretation 
apart from the expectation that for example the U.S.A. 
would file a difference to its own GPS standards if it 
would not meet them, as has been done on one minor 
item in the past. 
understandable that a State would not approve its use. 
However, a State would also have to be a lot more 
vigorous in insisting that such elements be disabled when 
entering its airspace, since it would need to establish that 
this constitutes a clear threat to safe operations. The 
current practice of leaving the situation ambiguous does 
not really support the idea of a valid safety concern. 
Instead of a somewhat philosophical discussion of the 
interpretations of articles 1 and 28 of the Chicago 
Convention, the need for States to approve GNSS 
elements should instead be based on article 12 CC: rules 
of the air. It states that “every aircraft flying over or 
manoeuvring within its territory… shall comply with the 
rules and regulations… there in force”. Rules of the air 
have a much more direct safety focus and are also subject 
to further conditioning by CC articles 11 (non-
discrimination), 33 (mutual recognition of certificates) 
and 37 (uniformity of regulation). While it will be 
difficult to make a legal case, it seems that if State A has 
approved an aircraft of its registry to use a GNSS element 
which is meeting all ICAO and certification standards, it 
would be a clear act of discrimination for State B to 
forbid the operation of such an aircraft in its airspace due 
to using a non-approved GNSS element. The mutual 
recognition of certificates is also directly linked to an 
equivalent safety level in accordance with the 
corresponding standards. The role of standards is clearly 
to prevent discrimination and enable mutual recognition. 
  
THE MEANING OF STATE APPROVALS 
The principles of sovereignty and safety support that a 
State should have a say in what signals are approved7 for 
use by aircraft in its airspace. However, what does it 
actually mean in terms of State responsibility if a State 
approves a GNSS element? Does a State then accept a 
liability which is largely beyond its control? This concern 
appears to be a main reason for why so many States 
hesitate to make explicit statements in their AIP’s 
mentioned earlier. Paradoxically, the insistence of a State 
to approve a GNSS element clashes with the associated 
responsibility to do so. There has been no effort so far to 
clarify the meaning of such approvals. It is equally 
understandable that a core constellation provider State 
does not want to sign up for any explicit acceptance of 
liability for providing a global service free of direct user 
charges as it is for a receiving State to not sign up to any 
explicit statement of acceptance of liability of matters that 
are outside of its control. 
This paper proposes that a States’ statement of approval 
of a GNSS element should also be limited to the matters 
that are under its jurisdiction. For this purpose, it is 
                                                          
7 Several different terms are under discussion, such as 
“approved”, “authorized”, “certified”, etc; for the 
purposes of this paper, only the term “approved” will be 
used. 
instructive to consider the GPS performance standard [19, 
section 2.4.5]: it applies only in space, just where the 
signals are leaving the antennas of the space vehicles. 
Propagation issues due to solar activity or other factors in 
the local receiver environment are considered to be 
outside of the provider’s control. Typical end-user 
performance is only indirectly indicated using 
representative error budgets. Although it is easy to accept 
that factors such as solar activity are also not under the 
control of the receiving State, they are subject to local 
variation and assessment and thus the interface of 
responsibility can be aligned with the performance 
standard. The following statements represent a proposed 
meaning of the act of State approval: 
- A State safety oversight process is in place to 
verify that a core constellation provider is 
meeting its obligations as specified in Annex 10 
(this role may of course be delegated, and some 
receiver States specifically encourage the 
provider States to self-declare such compliance 
[24]8.  
- The impact of nominal atmospheric and solar 
disturbances (ionosphere, troposphere) has been 
assessed and found to be within error budgets 
agreed for particular levels of service [25]. 
- The radio interference environment has been 
assessed and measures are in place to ensure that 
aircraft can operate without being subject to 
undue interference (confirming adequacy of its 
radio regulatory environment as well as reactive 
capabilities in the case of interference events) 
[26, Appendix F]. 
- Contingency measures are in place to deal with 
non-nominal situations, such as reversionary 
terrestrial infrastructure, if considered necessary.  
By performing these duties, which are in line with the 
GNSS Manual [26] and limited to things any individual 
State or group of States can assess and provide with 
reasonable effort, it could also be argued that a State is 
performing its duty of care, ensuring that operators can 
achieve the required service performance levels in their 
airspace. In other words, these proposed activities linked 
to a statement of approval could be seen as limiting 
liability rather than exposing a State to it. Having 
engaged in the activities listed above, it should be an easy 
argument to make that all has been done under its control 
to ensure safe operations, recognizing that in any complex 
technological system it is difficult to extrapolate to future 
performance based on historic analysis. 
Another argument that could be made in the context of 
State approval would be to assert that a State should not 
                                                          
8 A detailed discussion of GNSS safety oversight is 
outside the scope of this paper, but some basic principles 
are described in [26]. 
prevent an aircraft to use navigation signals which can 
help ensure the safety of its operation. As has been seen 
in the case of KAL007 [27] and many others, correct 
awareness of position by pilots is a key factor in 
preventing accidents. While it is useful to recognize that 
unnecessarily withholding navigation signals which are in 
compliance with standards in Annex 10 is not in the 
interest of safety, this would be difficult to argue in a 
court of law. It can also be observed that liability issues 
could become rather complex as soon as aircraft GNSS 
receivers make use of multiple constellations. Therefore, 
the current status of GNSS liability and associated 
possible new arguments deserve further attention. 
  
GNSS LIABILITY: AN UNSOLVABLE PROBLEM? 
The ICAO LTEP ended in a gridlock between one side 
saying that existing legal provisions are sufficient, while 
others argued that they are not. A more recent review [28] 
provides a clear analysis that legal instruments (both at 
the international air and space law and the national tort 
law level) in case of an accident caused primarily by a 
malfunction of a GNSS core constellation signal would 
face an arduous uphill battle with little chances of 
success. Taking the example of a so-called Controlled 
Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) accident with significant loss 
of life due to erroneous aircraft guidance, the aircraft 
operator would be faced with liability from the families 
and relatives of the deceased passengers. This could be 
done easily under national tort law, where each passenger 
concluded a contract with the aircraft operator by 
purchasing a ticket. It would then be up to the aircraft 
operator to seek regress from those responsible for the 
provision of those navigation signals. This could involve 
a significant number of parties: the local ANS Provider, 
the regulator overseeing the ANS provider, the State 
which funds the GNSS core constellation system, the 
operator of the system itself, or also the aircraft and 
avionics manufacturers. In all these cases, it is not clear 
what the applicable legal framework, the specific tort law 
or even the appropriate court jurisdiction would be. 
Additionally, given that many of the involved entities are 
sovereign States, it is quite possible that such States 
would bring to bear a sovereign immunity defense. Given 
these uncertainties, in combination with the absence of 
case law in both the common law and the civil law 
context9, such lawsuits would need to follow the 
applicable conflict of law rules. The outcome of such 
lawsuits would be highly unpredictable, thus likely 
requiring a lot of time and implying a lot of cost. But 
while there does exist quite clear argument that liability 
issues related to ANS provision using GNSS are 
                                                          
9 In layman’s terms, there are two basic law systems; civil 
law is more common in Continental Europe, common law 
in Anglo-Saxon countries, where case law has a more 
dominant role. The point here is that case law is also 
relevant under civil law, not only common law.  
 unsolved, the fact that the ICAO assembly resolution [10] 
tasking States to resolve them has not gotten any 
noteworthy attention over the course of many years with 
increasing use of GNSS, coupled with recent discussions 
in ICAO, it is also clear that States have very little 
appetite to restart such discussions. When faced with 
unsolvable problems, at least the possible reaction to 
them is simple: one can either accept the situation and 
live with the unsolvable problem, or something else needs 
to be done (in this case, stop using GNSS in aviation 
altogether – where current aircraft equipage makes this a 
rather preposterous proposition). So the subsequent 
question naturally becomes whether we can live with this 
unsolvable problem concerning GNSS liability? The 
following paragraphs will provide arguments as to why 
the answer to this question should be yes.  
One of the key “problems” in this context is that GNSS 
core constellation signals are provided for free, without 
direct user charges. Discussions of legal issues are for 
example non-existent in the domain of satellite 
communications, where the aircraft operators have to pay 
fees directly to the providers of such services. It is 
understandable and not uncommon that providers of free 
services do not want to sign up to liability commitments. 
It is useful to recall that aviation has also made explicit 
statements in this regard, declining any possible 
obligation to pay for core constellation GNSS services 
[29, 30]. Therefore, if aviation, as one GNSS-user 
segment among many, would press for a more satisfying 
resolution of liability then it would only be fair to also 
review the associated charging policy. It would be 
unfortunate if government-furnished services providing 
significant operational benefits at a high cost-efficiency 
for aviation would have to be given up for fully 
commercial services.   
Moving on to a more detailed analysis of the associated 
liability risk, over 20 years of aviation use of GPS and 
many more decades of only very few accidents where 
navigation systems have played a role in civil aircraft 
accidents underline that the risk of such accidents leading 
to liabilities are small. Even if Annex 10 maintains 
requirements on legal recording for all navigation 
systems, CNS system experts are generally not among the 
first responder team for an accident investigation [31]. In 
the case of GNSS, aviation has designed augmentation 
systems which have been designed to the best ability of 
international teams of experts to cater to all known 
system faults. The resulting standards are being adhered 
to through avionics certification standards and careful 
system oversight. While some of the faults that have 
occurred over the years certainly had a potential to cause 
accidents, currently implemented safeguards especially 
by the core constellation signal providers have typically 
stopped the possible fault-sequence early on and within a 
limited amount of time. From this point of view, it can be 
said that it would be very difficult to prove any willful or 
wrongful negligence, that would likely end up in a 
stalemate where the courts would have to weigh one 
expert advisors opinion against the expert advice from the 
other party. When this is compared to cases where entire 
ATC systems have shut down in busy terminal areas [32], 
the case of GNSS faults would seem like a relatively 
small risk that should be well-covered by normal ANSP 
insurance10.   
 
EXPANDING ON THE ICAO GNSS CHARTER 
Some main principles of the GNSS charter are: 
- Safety as the paramount principle; 
- Uniformity of regulation to the highest 
practicable degree; 
- Effective arrangements to minimize operational 
impact of system malfunctions; and 
- Conformance with ICAO standards and 
associated timely aeronautical information, if 
necessary. 
The current state of GNSS implementation has 
demonstrated that for GPS, safety performance, 
arrangements to minimize impact of system malfunctions, 
conformance with ICAO standards and the provision of 
aeronautical information are satisfactory, and can be 
expected to continue in this manner. Already today this 
seems to be less true for uniformity of regulation, given 
the struggle of many States to declare their GNSS 
approval status. Current positions underlying the 
development of multi-constellation GNSS applications 
within the ICAO Navigation Systems Panel threaten to 
undermine this uniformity further. Since the days of 
Marconi [33], radio signals have brought people together. 
Radio signals do not respect State boundaries, following 
the imagination of John Lennon [34]. While admittedly 
aviation frequency assignment practices often take such 
boundaries into account for terrestrial navigation aids, 
current multi-sensor avionics use such signals wherever 
they can be received, leaving the responsibility to judge 
the goodness of the navigation signal for use to the 
avionics. Inherent in the design of terrestrial navigation 
aid signals is the notion that they are usable wherever 
they can be received (IDENT can only be decoded when 
the modulation components are stable11). This is also the 
basis of aviation’s enthusiasm for GNSS as a seamless 
system for all phases of flight [35].  
As mentioned earlier, more detailed interpretation of the 
GNSS charter based on currently established GPS 
                                                          
10 Evaluating aircraft accident insurance issues was not 
done in support of this paper, and would deserve some 
further work. 
11 Pilots, with support from avionics, should always first 
“identify” the correct tuning of a radio navigation facility 
before using it. This is done through the broadcast of an 
audible morse code in conventional navigation systems. 
practice as a best practices benchmark is being pursued 
further [2, 22, 23]. In summary, it is expected to include 
the following elements: 
- Inclusion of core constellation system 
performance aspects in ICAO Annex 10. This 
makes it an aviation system, also for the 
purposes of establishing its recognition as a 
safety service under the ITU radio regulations 
[36]12; 
- Provision of detailed system performance 
standards and interface control documents. What 
may still require some further work are detailed 
methods on how to demonstrate that the system 
is meeting requirements which are essential to 
the performance of augmentation services; 
- Provision of user support and notices of satellite 
outages; 
- Aviation receiver certification standards based 
on sufficient insight into the system failure 
modes (Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality 
Analysis, FMECA); 
- Transparent communication and remedial action 
in case of system malfunctions.   
While the above are provider obligations, the “receiver 
obligations” (here in the form of the ANS provider taking 
advantage of the GNSS signals in its service provision to 
airspace users), the corresponding duties have been 
outlined in the section above on State approvals. This 
additional guidance material would then serve as a sort of 
a substitute intermediary, replacing the need for formal, 
direct contracts with all ICAO contracting States 
(currently 191). They would mitigate liability risk and be 
in line with principles of sovereignty, while more 
explicitly establishing methods to approve GNSS 
elements in a given airspace. Moreover, these best 
practices underline safety as the paramount principle. But 
how far can they go in achieving the highest practicable 
degree of uniformity of regulation? 
 
UNIFORMITY OF REGULATION 
The purpose of uniformity of regulation is again safety: if 
pilots have to change their procedures when they fly from 
one State to another, the chances of those procedures 
being applied correctly diminish. Pilots are admonished 
to respect such regulations since this essential to limit the 
                                                          
12 GNSS is classified as a “Radio Navigation Satellite 
System”, which is not considered to be a safety system 
with additional protection to guarantee interference-free 
operation. Only the aeronautical use of GNSS is 
considered a safety use for ITU purposes under the RNSS 
allocation. 
extent of their liability [37]. Because liability limits could 
be waved when pilots do not respect a State’s GNSS 
element approval status, inherently pilots wish to comply, 
even if current equipage functionality does not cater for 
that. Safety rules have to be as simple as possible. This 
also reduces overall system cost, and is one of the main 
reasons for establishing ICAO standards in all aspects of 
international civil aviation. If now a receiver specific 
function to comply with differences in regulation is 
implemented in avionics, it does appropriately reduce the 
burden of the pilots, however, it is not without technical 
safety risks. Databases can be out of date, and receivers 
are subject to potentially complex mode switching, 
especially when flying near boundaries with different 
approval status, requiring multiple re-initializations while 
in flight. Furthermore, the number of receiver interfaces 
is multiplied, and database storage requirements will 
increase significantly beyond the current state of the art 
[38]. Most importantly, the expected gain in system 
robustness from introducing multi-constellation GNSS 
will largely be nullified. It is impossible to make a 
convincing argument for safety reasons that a GNSS 
element considered safe in one region of the world should 
not be safe in another, since core constellation 
performance is largely uniform globally by nature (some 
differences do exist as a function of latitude). Of course 
what underlies this assessment is the assumption that 
appropriate compliance with standards has been verified. 
So rather than pursuing a clearly non-optimal technical 
solution, it is suggested that energy should instead be 
devoted towards ensuring this standards compliance in a 
cooperative manner. Maintaining a generous positive 
margin between claimed and achieved performance will 
remain important to ensure that such standards 
compliance does not become the subject of intense expert 
debate.  
 
LINK TO PBN PRINCIPLES 
It is widely recognized that the implementation of PBN 
has led to significant operational benefits, including more 
efficient routing and reduced environmental impact. 
GNSS based on single-frequency GPS L1 and Receiver 
Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) is currently 
the principal enabler of all PBN specification, and also 
essential to Aircraft Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast 
(ADS-B). These receivers are still mostly based on a 
supplemental means certification standard [39], while it is 
clear that the role of GPS L1 is becoming a primary 
system, where conventional navigation aids provide a 
reversionary role instead of vice-versa. PBN remains for 
the most part a horizontal, en-route and terminal area 
navigation application, and has only recently started to 
expand into the approach domain. When it comes to 
approaches with vertical guidance in low visibility 
conditions, due to the associated increased criticality of 
operations, it is recognized that the enabling system 
safety standards need to be more prescriptive. But even 
there, the notion of XLS has been established, where the 
X stands for the corresponding technology (Instrument, 
 Microwave or GNSS). While this is a more recent 
development, the concept of multi-sensor navigation for 
horizontal navigation has already a long history. A 
somewhat similar case to GNSS are DME’s, or Distance 
Measuring Equipment, providing range measurements to 
aircraft, based on interrogating terrestrial transponders. 
PBN uses DME up to a maximum range of at least 
160NM, where the individual facility Designated 
Operational Coverage (DOC) is often much smaller. The 
use of such ranging signals outside of the frequency 
protected range, while not without its own complexities, 
has been accepted, since there has been no mechanism for 
avionics to know what the official usable range is. To 
change this, a new, more appropriate facility information 
data field has been defined for ARINC 424 [40] (the 
aeronautical database message format definition), but 
never implemented – in part for sure because it has never 
been made a requirement through regulation. As a result, 
an avionics navigation solution based on multi-DME 
ranging will often contain sources from several different 
States, especially when operating at altitude. It can be 
speculated that this has been accepted because it normally 
involves only neighboring States, but nonetheless so far 
this has not raised a discussion on sovereignty and 
liability as has been the case for GNSS. While improving 
the connection between assured facility coverage and its 
operational use in avionics would certainly have merit, 
using signals where available remains a fundamental tenet 
of PBN to ensure seamless and continuous navigation 
around the globe without an excessive regulatory burden; 
that is the main motivation behind the effort to globally 
agree a limited set of navigation specifications to support 
PBN. Also from the point of view of efficient use of radio 
spectrum, it does not make sense to artificially limit the 
use of aeronautical navigation signals to an area that is 
significantly smaller than the coverage that is actually 
provided. 
This discussion of established PBN principles is provided 
to make the point that certainly for the en-route and 
terminal area use of horizontal positioning, an 
unconstrained possibility to combine ranging sources has 
been key to its success. When it comes to final approach 
operations with their higher level of safety-criticality, 
there is always a need for the aircraft to receive a final 
approach path definition, whether this be through an 
aeronautical database (which has limits in the achievable 
integrity level13) or through the system itself (GBAS, 
ILS). Through that path definition it then also makes 
sense to specify the system which supports the operation. 
The available augmentation systems to support such 
operations when based on GNSS will automatically limit 
the available core constellations. For example, EGNOS 
                                                          
13 Of course SBAS gets around this issue by means of the 
Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) algorithm. The point 
here is that with multiple interfaces across the avionics 
architecture, current database structures may not lend 
themselves easily to accommodating geo-tuning 
complexities. 
(the European version of SBAS) today only provides 
corrections for GPS, consequently, the use of core 
constellation signals when flying an EGNOS approach 
will naturally be limited to GPS. If States wish to be more 
prescriptive on the use of core constellation signals on 
final approach with vertical path guidance, the problem 
will easily resolve itself through the corresponding 
approach chart publication. This is clearly not the case for 
horizontal-only navigation.   
 
SUMMARY 
This paper has revisited the link to sovereignty principles 
for the provision of ANS using multiple GNSS core 
constellations. It is argued that sovereignty concerns can 
be fully mitigated through the provision of terrestrial 
reversionary navigation infrastructure, while in the case 
of GNSS, it should motivate States to approve as many 
core constellation signals as possible, as long as it can be 
established that they comply with the appropriate 
standards. While the analysis agrees that States do retain 
the right to approve which signals are being used by 
aircraft operating within their airspace, it is argued that 
this stems primarily from the State’s responsibility for 
safety (through article 12 CC) rather than to satisfy 
sovereignty. When it comes to liability, arguments have 
been provided which make the case that mitigation of this 
risk comes through ensuring compliance with standards 
as well, and that any residual risks are small and 
insurable, especially when considering the alternatives 
which would question the premise of aviation using core 
constellation signals free of direct user charges. An 
interpretation of the meaning of State approval of GNSS 
core constellation signals has also been provided, limiting 
this responsibility (and the corresponding interpretation 
of the extent of its liability) to things which can be 
assessed and controlled by the State itself. 
In terms of practical implementation, to help States 
become comfortable with these arguments, the ICAO 
GNSS charter principles (in particular safety and 
uniformity of regulation) should be expanded by adding 
appropriate guidance spelling out the interpretation of 
these principles based on established best practice with 
GPS. This should serve as a benchmark for other 
constellations in providing services to aviation, hopefully 
enabling the future implementation of a fully robust, 
optimal GNSS without artificial limitations to the best use 
of navigation signals. It is hoped that this will be possible 
especially for horizontal positioning applications, 
avoiding the need to implement geo-referenced GNSS 
element tuning. 
Further work should consequently focus on improving 
performance metrics for GNSS core constellations in 
supporting specific augmentation systems, as is being 
envisioned by Advanced RAIM developments to support 
future multi-constellation GNSS use. Emphasis is made 
there for example on demonstrating compliance of core 
constellations with the assumed ranging performance and 
satellite and constellation fault probabilities. To generate 
global agreement on such values, an approach similar to 
that used for Reduced Vertical Separation Minima 
(RVSM14), where regional organizations cooperate 
globally to ensure compliance to a Target Safety Level 
(TSL), could be used. Such mechanisms for GNSS should 
help to extend the Chicago Convention principles of non-
discrimination (article 11 CC) and mutual recognition of 
certificates (article 33 CC) to GNSS core constellations in 
a manner that can be acceptable to all ICAO contracting 
States. Whatever the outcome in terms of future multi-
constellation GNSS receiver functionalities and the 
preservation of the associated benefits, it is recommended 
that a practical and balanced view of all relevant ICAO 
principles must prevail. The current interim conclusion to 
require State-specific approval based receiver tuning does 
not seem to be based on such complete reasoning. This 
paper can hopefully make a first contribution towards 
such a balanced approach.  
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